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Article 9

Notes
Negligence

-

Guest Statute -

Owner As A Guest

-

Wife As A Guest
In Naphtali v. Lafazan,' defendant and his wife accepted the
invitation of plaintiffs, husband and wife, to accompany them on
a pleasure trip in an auto owned by plaintiff-husband. It was
understood that the expenses of operating the auto were to be
borne by plaintiff-husband. As the party proceeded along an Ohio
highway, with the defendant driving, the auto left the highway
and overturned, injuring the plaintiffs. Suit was instituted in
New York, alleging defendant's ordinary negligence and praying
damages for the injuries sustained. Defendant relied upon the
Ohio Guest Statute,2 arguing that plaintiffs were "guests" in the
auto and therefore could not recover in the absence of proof of
defendant's gross negligence. Two interesting questions were thus
presented: (1) Was the plaintiff-owner a "guest" in his own auto,
and (2) was the owner's wife a "guest"? Though there were no
Ohio cases in point, the New York Supreme Court held, inter alia,
that the owner might recover on proof of defendant's ordinary
negligence, as it was not the intention of the Ohio Legislature to
make an owner a "guest" in his own auto. On complicated reasoning, however, plaintiff-wife was found to be a guest and was denied
recovery, since there was no proof of defendant's gross negligence.

Taphtali v. Lafazan, 165 N.Y.S. 2d 395 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
Page's Ohio General Code, § 6308-6, 1945: (with slight modification, this
statute is now § 4515.02, Ohio New Revised Code) "[Liability of owners and
operators of motor vehicles to guests; exception] The owner, operator, or
person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not be liable
for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest while being
transported without payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, resulting from the operation thereof, unless such injuries or death are caused
by the wilful or wanton misconduct of such operator, owner, or person
responsible for the operation of said motor vehicle."
3 "To hold that if the owner of an automobile is riding therein and a
friend is driving, the owner is the guest of the friend simply because the
friend is driving, would be to import into the statute a meaning not expressed by the legislature." Glendhill v. Connecticut Co., 121 Conn. 102, 183
Atl. 379, 381 (1936).
2

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
I. THE OWNER AS A GUEST
Though decisions supporting the court's position were available
from Connecticut,3 Pennsylvania, 4 and California,5 the court did
not consider them, professing an inability to locate such cases. 6
Instead, reliance was placed upon certain Ohio cases to the effect
that the guest statute was in derogation of the common law 7 and
must be strictly construed.8
The construction given by the court appears unduly strict and

4

Lorch v. Eglin, 369 Pa. 314, 85 A.2d 841 (1952), in which the Pennsylvania

court relied not only upon the notion of unseemliness in holding the owner
to be a guest as expressed by the Connecticut court, note 3 supra, and later
by the New York court in Naphtali, but also upon the alternative argument
that the owner, by furnishing the use of his auto, acquired the status of
a "passenger" and so became exempt from the guest statute on that basis.
The court stated:

".

.

. that not only would it be contrary to any ordinary

meaning of the term guest to hold that the owner of a car was the 'guest'
of his friend who was driving it, but it cannot be said that such an owner
is being transported 'without payment for such transportation,' since he
is furnishing the use of his automobile and thereby contributing to the cost
of the transportation the equivalent of the rental value of the car." Id. at
319 and 843.
5 Ray v. Hanisch, 306 P.2d 30 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal., 1957). Although the
court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff-owner upon a procedural ground,
the court left no doubt as to its position on the merits: "We think the
reasoning of the Glendhill and Lorch cases is logical and unanswerable."
306 P.2d at 34. This reliance and acceptance by the court of the Connecticut
and Pennsylvania decisions, notes 3 and 4 supra, has been attacked on the
ground that such cases rely upon a social or dictionary definition of the
term guest while California had previously developed a different and more
specific definition. See 57 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 652 (1957). Be this as it may,
the court, citing the Ray case as authority, has just squarely held that an
owner cannot be a guest within his own auto. Ahlgren v. Ahlgren, 313 P. 2d
88 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal., 1957).
6 A statement from Anderson v. Burkhardt, 275 N. Y. 281, 283, 9 N. E. 2d
929 (1937) misleadingly paraphrased and incongruously relied upon in
the Lorch and Ray cases, notes 4 and 5 supra, should also be noted: "A
passenger may recover for injuries received in a collision between two autoThis is the so-called
mobiles even though both drivers were at fault ....
'guest rule'. It does not apply, however, to the owner who is being driven
in his own car; he is no guest." No guest statute was involved and the
court was obviously referring to the New York rule that a guest-driver's
negligence is imputed to the owner to bar the latter's recovery against a
negligent third party. Far from supporting the view that an owner may
not be a guest within his own auto for guest statute purposes, the case, to
the extent that it is at all rele- ant, supports the contrary view.
7
Dorn v. Village of North Olmstead, 133 Ohio St. 375, 381, 14 N.E.2d
11, 14 (1938).
8 Miller v. Fairley, 141 Ohio St. 327, 335, 48 N. E. 2d 217, 221 (1943).
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does violence to the legislative intent. As the court recognized,
guest statutes are enacted for two basic reasons: (1) to prevent
collusion between friendly parties to the detriment of liability insurance companies, and (2) to avoid the supposed impropriety involved in permitting a guest to recover for his host's ordinary negligence.9 Where the owner is allowed to sue his agent-driver, the
possibility of collusion at the expense of an insurance company is
equally as great as where the guest sues the host. Again, it is as
"improper" to permit an owner to sue his agent-driver for the
latter's ordinary negligence as for the guest to be allowed to sue
his host for ordinary negligence. The court's unduly strict construction is further highlighted by the circumstance that, as a
matter of first impression, a guest statute might well be considered
as remedial in nature and entitled to a "liberal" construction.
Another weakness of the decision lies in the court's apparent
position that an owner may never be a guest in his auto, presumably not even where he has leased his auto for consideration. Whatever general view be taken of the owner's guest-statute status, to
hold him to be outside the statute in the case supposed appears
wholly untenable. Apart from this, however, it would seem that
the policy considerations underlying the guest statute require that
the owner be considered as a guest unless, of course, he can show
"passenger" status 0 upon the same basis as a non-owner. A further
9Prosser, Torts, 450-452 (2 ed. 1955) ". .

guest statutes ... have been

enacted under the impetus of a feeling that the gratuitous guest is entitled

to no claim against his host for the ordinary mishaps of modern traffic,
and under the impetus of the claim of liability insurance companies that
frequent collusion between host and guest has increased insurance claims."
10 The distinction between "guest" and "passenger" under the guest statutes is generally said to depend upon whether or not the occupant has
conferred a "benefit" upon the owner or operator. A "passenger" is one

who has conferred such a benefit while the "guest" is one who has not. The
"passenger," of course, is without the statute. The problem of what constitutes a benefit has been the subject of many conflicting decisions. Certainly, no single definition is all encompassing. The Nebraska court has
stated the distinction thusly: ".

.

. we conclude that a person riding in a

motor vehicle is a guest if his carriage confers only a benefit upon himself
and no benefit upon the owner or operator except such as is incidental to
hospitality, social relations, companionship, or the like, as a mere gratuity,
and no recovery can be had under our statute except for gross negligence.
However, if his carriage contributes such tangible and substantial benefits
as to promote the mutual interests of both the passenger and the owner or
operator, or is primarily for the attainment of some tangible and substantial
objective or business purpose of the owner or operator, he is not a guest."
Van Aucker v. Steckley's Hybrid Seed Corn Co., 143 Neb. 24, 27, 8 N. W. 2d
451, 454 (1943).
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objection to the position that the owner can never be a guest is
noted below."
As yet, this issue has not arisen under the Nebraska Guest
Statute.' 2 However, our Supreme Court has used the term "guest"
to describe the owner-occupant of an auto driven by a guest where
the owner-occupant was injured by the negligence of a third party. 13
The problem in such cases was whether at the time of the accident
the owner-occupant had such a degree of "control" over the guestdriver that the latter's negligence could justifiably be imputed to
the owner in order to bar his recovery against the third party. This
is quite different from declaring the owner to be a guest within
the meaning of the guest statute. Aside from a case where an
owner-occupant has leased his auto for a consideration, guest status
under the guest statute has nothing to do with the question of the
owner's "control." Accordingly, the issue must arise in Nebraska
as one of first impression.
II. THE WIFE AS A GUEST
The position taken by the wife was that no husband today considers his wife as a guest when she accompanies him in his auto.
In rejecting this argument and holding the wife to be a guest, the
court reasoned: (1) that the wife was a guest of her owner-husband;
(2) that in any suit by the wife against the husband, he would have
the defense of the guest statute; (3) that the guest-driver of the

11 Infra, page 471.
12 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-740 (Reissue 1952).

13 The court has held that the guest-driver's negligence is not ordinarily
imputable to the owner-occupant so as to bar the latter's recovery against
negligent third-parties. Peterson v. Schneider (On Rehearing), 154 Neb.
303, 47 N. W. 2d 863 (1941), (Plaintiff-owner being driven by a non-family
guest); Gorman v. Bratka, 139 Neb. 718, 298 N. W. 691 (1941); Bartek v.
Glazers Provisions Co., 160 Neb. 795, 71 N. W. 2d 466 (1955), (Plaintiff ownerwife being driven by husband). Note, however, the recent case of Fairchild
v. Sorenson, 165 Neb. 667, -N. W.2d-, (1958) where the plaintiff-wife, though
not the owner, was held to be responsible for the consequences of her own
negligence in failing to warn her driver-husband of known approaching
danger in the form of defendant's auto, and thereby barred from recovery
against the defendant.

Another line of cases are those where the owner-occupant is named
as defendant by a third-party injured by the negligence of the owner's guestdriver. In this situation, the court has held the owner liable by raising an
almost conclusive presumption that the owner had "control." Sutton v.
Inland Construction Co., 144 Neb. 721, 14 N. W. 2d 387 (1944).
In none of the above cases, however, was the owner's status under
the guest statute under consideration by the court.

NOTES
auto was acting as the agent of the husband; and (4) that an agent,
in defending against third parties, may assume the guest statute defense of his principal. 14
The key to this complicated reasoning is the decision that the
wife was the husband's guest, and the holding of the court cannot
be criticized. A contrary decision would have guaranteed the wife's
recovery by removing the husband's guest-statute defense, resulting in an immediate increase in Ohio of auto liability suits between
husband and wife. 15 Further, such a decision could become analogous authority for decisions that the owner's children, parents, etc.,
also could not be considered guests within the owner's auto. Decisions of this type would flood the courts with collusive suits between members of the owner's family, causing the destruction of
the guest statute by exceptions.
Other States, including Arkansas, 16 and Minnesota'7 have held
the wife to be a guest under similar circumstances. Nebraska has
not had occasion to do so, since in this State a wife may not sue
her husband for personal injuries. 8 Thus a Nebraska decision holding the wife not to be the guest of her owner-husband would not
have the same emasculating effect upon the guest statute that
would be true in Ohio. Even so, there is no sound reason for allowing the wife to be removed from the provisions of the guest statute
in the absence of proof of "passenger" status.
The fundamental weakness of the decision lies not in holding
the wife to be a guest, but in basing the husband's exemption from
the guest statute upon ownership alone. This basis of exemption
produces two incongruous results. First, it is clear from the decision that the wife would have recovered from the defendant on
the same basis as her husband, had the auto been jointly owned.
The anomoly of making a paper transaction between husband and
wife the basis for exemption from the guest statute is too obvious
for comment. That anomoly is further highlighted in Naphtali
by the fact that it was the husband and not the wife who was the
14 "An agent who is acting in pursuance of his authority has such immunities of the principal as are not personal to the principal." Restatement
Agency, § 347.
15 Action in tort between spouses is maintainable in Ohio, Damm v. Elyria
Lodge, 158 Ohio St. 107, 121, 107 N. E. 2d 337, 344 (1952).
16 Roberson v. Roberson, 193 Ark. 669, 101 S. W. 2d 961 (1937).
17 Krinke v. Gramer, 187 Minn. 595, 246 N. W. 376 (1933).
IsEmerson v.Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N. W. 297
(1927).

